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Undermining “The Deal of the Century”:
The Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline & the Failure of American
Economic Pressure on the Soviet Energy Industry
Brandon von Kannewurff

In late 1981, President Ronald Reagan blindsided his
Western European allies and imposed far-reaching unilateral
sanctions on the USSR. Ostensibly issued in response to the
declaration of martial law in Poland, these sanctions suspended
existing American contracts with the USSR to construct a 3,000mile natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.1 Six
months later, the United States doubled down despite fierce
European opposition. On June 18, 1982, Reagan again sided with
his hardline advisors and ruled that subsidiaries and licensees of
U.S. companies that produced equipment abroad would violate U.S.
law if they supplied the Soviet Union these parts. However, the
United States’ determination to exert economic pressure fizzled out
by the end of the year. Though the U.S. backed down on sanctions
in November 1982, it still claimed victory and argued that the new
agreement with Western Europe would prove even more effective at
countering the influence of the Soviet Union.
Even today, these sanctions remain the centerpiece of the
Reagan Victory School narrative that the U.S. systematically
exploited Soviet economic weakness to triumph in the Cold War.
This view, popularized by historian Francis Marlo and journalist
Peter Schweizer, identifies U.S. pressure on the Soviet oil and gas
industry as a critical piece of the equation. In his book Victory,
Schweizer claims that the American ability to undermine the
Siberian pipeline and its pressure on Saudi Arabia to flood the oil
markets was part of “a secret offensive on economic, geostrategic,
and psychological fronts designed to roll back and weaken Soviet
power.”2 Marlo’s account makes a similar, if more measured, point.
In his book Planning Reagan’s War, he argues that the Reagan
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administration knew “the Soviet economy was stagnating, with
economic growth and labor productivity steeply declining while raw
material costs were skyrocketing,” and capitalized on this weakness
to undermine the influence of the Soviet state.3 These ‘Reagan
Victory School’ views theorize that American pressure impelled
Gorbachev to pursue reform and end the Cold War on Western
terms.
Recent scholarship from revisionist historians David Painter
and Tyler Esno rejects these claims. In his essay “Oil and the End of
the Cold War,” Painter explores the macro-level effects of Reagan’s
Cold War policy. He ultimately concludes that “there is little
evidence” Gorbachev embarked on economic reform as a result of
U.S. policies.4 Esno, on the other hand, dives deeper into Reagan’s
personal conception of economic pressure through the Siberian
pipeline. He argues that Reagan “stumbled into an economic war
against the Soviet Union” and abandoned economic pressure once it
proved ineffective.5
After weighing newly released FRUS documents against
memoirs and the current historiography, this paper finds that the
‘Reagan Victory School’ narrative has not stood the test of time.
Throughout his presidency, Reagan’s goal remained the same: to
elevate America’s bargaining position and, once that was
accomplished, negotiate with the Soviet Union on American terms.
Ineffective sanctions on the Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline, however,
caused Reagan to shift tactics once unilateral American pressure
proved counterproductive to his negotiating goals. This idea was
echoed by Soviet leaders during this period. Not only were General
Secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko not swayed by
American pressure early in the decade, their successor, Mikhail
Gorbachev, already believed in the need to reform economically
when he took power in 1985. Although Reagan centered his
economic pressure on the Soviet energy industry, his counterpart
focused more broadly on larger inefficiencies in industrial and
agricultural production, military spending, and the moral standing
of the Soviet economy. Thus, while oil and gas did play a role in
inducing Gorbachev to reform, its impact was relatively minor,
especially when compared to the weight given by ‘Victory School’
advocates.
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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American Intelligence & Perceptions of Soviet Energy
Weakness
By the end of the 1970s, the CIA famously predicted a stark
future for the Soviet energy economy. In a widely circulated 1977
study, the agency claimed that Soviet petroleum output would peak
by 1980 and that the energy giant would become a net oil importer
just five years later.6 The CIA understood that General Secretary
Brezhnev’s government prioritized investment speed over quality—
a choice that led to inefficient use of resources and placed major
strains on long run production viability. Under pressure to boost
petroleum production, Soviet state oil companies injected water in
new wells to rapidly ramp up extraction, a practice that illustrated
the USSR’s production woes. While most producers around the
globe utilized this tactic to some degree, Soviet producers took it to
the extreme. By the early 1980s, “the volume of water injected
exceeded not only the volume of oil produced, but it even surpassed
the amount of fluids produced.”7 These aggressive tactics
dramatically shortened the life of even the richest oilfields and
caused productivity to plummet. Despite Brezhnev’s heavy focus on
investment and employment, overall petroleum output fell by 21
percent from 1975-1985.8 The 1977 CIA report proved that the
agency was keenly aware of these industry headwinds. The paper
predicted the share of new oil output required to offset inefficient
production from older fields would rise to an astounding 80 percent
by 1980.9 Though this claim underestimated the sector’s resilience,
the report overall accurately portrayed the weaknesses facing the
Soviet energy industry during this period.10
Three interrelated macroeconomic developments within the
oil industry during the 1970s also made the Soviet economy heavily
vulnerable to developments in global energy trade. Firstly, price
spikes during the decade incentivized the Kremlin to further open
up what had once been a contained economy. In eight years between
1972 and 1980, Soviet oil exports rose by 50 percent, while soaring
prices boosted Soviet revenue by a staggering factor of 18.11 This
boom fundamentally changed the composition of the Soviet
economy. The previously closed market “in fact bec[a]me deeply
integrated into the system of international trade and dependent on
world markets.”12 The CIA particularly understood that this
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increased openness could provide an opportunity for the West to dial
up the pressure on its adversary. In a 1981 report, the CIA observed
that “[i]f the USSR were denied access to Western equipment and
technology, the Soviets would be forced to go it alone, entailing
major losses in product quality and labor productivity.”13 Thus,
while rising oil prices offered the USSR the opportunity to earn hard
currency revenues, the CIA believed this exposure also rendered the
economy vulnerable to the threat of trade pressure from Western
allies.
Perhaps more important than the gross oil revenues
themselves was how the Kremlin used these oil revenues. In the
early 1970s, a series of poor harvests and inefficiencies in industrial
production led Brezhnev’s government to import a large quantity of
foodstuffs, machinery, ore, and metals.14 At the same time, the
government began to use oil as a “‘swing fuel’ in adjusting the hard
currency trade balance” in order to avoid trade deficits.15 In this case
also, the CIA knew the USSR was using oil revenues as a crutch to
balance trade deficits. In the same 1981 report, the agency observed
that rising energy and gold prices allowed the Soviets to fund its
$12.5 billion in food imports in 1981.16 While using oil as a swing
fuel made sense in theory, U.S. intelligence officials understood that
changes in global energy trade would not just affect the Kremlin.
Instead, the use of oil revenues as a swing fuel rendered the basic
needs of the bloc’s population vulnerable to macroeconomic
developments.
Finally, the Kremlin could still have justified this strategy if
it had proactively insulated the economy to energy price volatility.
As historian Philip Hanson shows, relying on oil revenues was
“eminently sustainable so long as oil prices did not collapse.”17 To
protect themselves from macroeconomic shifts, resource-driven
economies such as the USSR typically “create hard currency
reserves or invest the income in liquid financial instruments,” such
as the massive Sovereign Wealth Funds common in oil-driven
economies like the UAE and Norway.18 Brezhnev took none of these
precautions. Instead, his administration viewed energy exports as an
apparently permanent revenue source, an assumption that
endangered the greater economy. .19 The CIA, however, recognized
the danger of a do-nothing policy. Since the USSR did not take the
proper precautionary measures, the agency claimed “the hard
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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currency prospects [were not] bright in the immediate years ahead”
in a market facing stagnant or declining oil prices.20 Despite historic
revenues during the 1970s, failure to reform created a highly risky
situation in the USSR.
Finally, although the CIA understood the acute problems
facing the Soviet oil industry, the agency did not believe unilateral
U.S. sanctions would drastically affect Soviet behavior. The CIA
considered the Brezhnev leadership resistant to change. Soviet
leadership believed that “their economic problems, while serious,
are not cause for panic, and should begin to ease during the 1990s.”21
Additionally, despite the hardline beliefs of its director, the agency
itself did not believe economic pressure would induce change
without sustained help from U.S. allies. Instead, its report on
potential sanctions for the Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline found that
“[i]n none of these cases would unilateral US actions have much
effect. Any decision to impose additional restrictions would have to
consider their impact on the West as well as on the USSR.”22 These
qualifications, however, mattered less to hardliners in the Reagan
administration than the report’s tone, which stressed that the USSR
was clearly vulnerable to Western influence.
The Reagan Administration & the Siberian Natural Gas
Pipeline
Eager to test the resolve of the Soviet energy industry,
Reagan believed that the U.S. could place significant pressure on the
empire’s economic capacity by opposing construction of the
Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline. Heralded as “the deal of the century”
upon its official announcement in 1980, the resource-rich Soviet
Union designed the pipeline to export its bountiful natural gas to
energy-hungry Western Europe.23 For the Soviet Union, the pipeline
would serve as a critical source of hard currency revenues, with the
potential to draw in five billion dollars in revenues annually to the
cash-strapped state. For Western Europe, the project would diversify
energy imports away from the Middle East and could potentially tie
Soviet interests tighter to those of Western European allies.24 While
the Carter administration raised concerns about relying on the
West’s ideological enemy for energy, the U.S. eventually bowed to
its allies and reluctantly allowed the deal to go through.25 The
Published
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incoming Reagan administration, however, sought to challenge
these notions retroactively. Afraid the trade deal would give the
Soviet Union unwanted leverage over its Western allies, Reagan
administration officials first raised concerns over the pipeline at an
Ottawa economic summit in July 1981.26 Though these ideas were
met with a tepid response, an opportunity to dispel American
malaise arose five months later when Poland declared martial law to
counteract rising political opposition.
Opinions on how to respond to Soviet repression were
mixed. The hardliners, consisting of CIA director Bill Casey,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs, William Clark, strongly
believed that the Kremlin depended on trade with the West to
improve the bloc’s standard of living. Since “the key to the drive for
military power has been the ability of the Soviet economy to provide
small but steady improvements to the standard of living,” this group
believed that all trade to the USSR essentially constituted economic
aid.27 Cognizant of the CIA’s reports on Soviet energy weakness,
yet not mindful of its warnings, hardliners sought to ramp up
pressure on the U.S.’ adversary.28 Writing in the wake of the first
round of sanctions, Weinberger reflected: “the events in Poland have
created our best opportunity for derailing the West Siberia to
Western Europe national gas pipeline project...”29 CIA director
Casey also held more hawkish views than the agency he directed. If
the U.S. imposed extraterritoriality by preventing pipeline sales of
all foreign subsidiaries and licensees, it could “delay completion of
the pipeline by something close to 3 years.”30 These hardliners held
lofty views of American economic coercive power and eagerly
argued that flexing these muscles would elevate the geopolitical
power of the United States.
While both the hardliners and the moderates believed that
the Siberian pipeline was antithetical to the goals of the Reagan
administration, they strongly differed on whether to oppose the
pipeline itself. In the initial sanctions discussion, moderate officials,
such as Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Baldridge, brought a more nuanced position to the table.
Though agreeing in principle on the need to exert economic pressure
on the USSR, Baldridge noted that: “[w]e want to be as tough as we
can, operating in the real world. If we go too far and can’t get our
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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Allies to go with us, it won’t work… We cannot stop all these
countries from shipping to the USSR.”31 Secretary Haig offered
similar advice. While he acknowledged that the pipeline “runs
contrary to our security interests,” he also asserted that “by pursuing
our maximum objectives, we run the risk of coming away with very
little, severely weakening the Alliance and isolating us from our
Allies.”32 These moderate officials held similar views as the CIA
reports: that unilateral U.S. economic sanctions would fracture the
East-West alliance while failing to place pressure on the Soviet
economy.
While aware of the potential downsides of sanctions,
Reagan’s ideological alignment with the hardliners swayed him to
pursue a policy of coercion. In this moment, Reagan’s ideological
fervor to strengthen the geopolitical position of the capitalist West
reigned supreme over his belief in free trade. Reagan “always
believed that, as an economic system, Communism was doomed,”
and during his first NSC briefings, he learned that the USSR “was
approaching the brink of collapse.”33 His comments during early
NSC meetings highlighted this ideological fervor. Speaking in favor
of more intensive sanctions on key equipment for Siberian oil
construction, Reagan justified his position by claiming the moral
high ground: “I for one don’t think we are being harsh or rigid. The
Soviets have spoken as plainly as Hitler did in ‘Mein Kampf.’ They
have spoken world domination—at what point do we dig in our
heels?”34 This was not the only time the president likened his
adversary to Nazi Germany. A year later, also in an NSC meeting
discussing sanctions, the president continued to support hardline
measures, claiming that: “President Roosevelt called for a
quarantine on Germany in 1939. He had his brains kicked out. What
would history have been like if he had been listened to?”35
Influenced heavily by his closely held ideological views, Reagan
sided with the hardliners and imposed unilateral U.S. sanctions on
the Soviet Union on December 30th, 1981.
Western European Opposition & Reagan’s Reversal
Western European reaction was swift and uniformly harsh.
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt resolutely proclaimed
“the pipeline will be built,” while the French foreign minister
Published
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reacted with outrage and bombastically declared the beginning of a
“‘progressive divorce’ within the alliance because ‘we no longer
speak the same language.’”36 Across the entire political spectrum in
Western Europe, officials denounced U.S. actions. They vowed to
continue the pipeline project without U.S. support, signaling a stark
decline of American geopolitical influence.
While Reagan did attempt to mitigate the impact of his
decision on the U.S.’ allies, he initially did not allow the concerns
of Western Europe to overrule his own convictions. Writing to the
president’s assistant for national security affairs, William Clark,
NSC Staff member Richard Pipes said he believed backing down
“will destroy once and for all any credibility of the policy of
economic sanctions,” which “would be particularly regrettable now
that the Soviet Union faces an unprecedented economic crisis and is
more than ever vulnerable to various economic pressures.”37 Reagan
and the hardliners believed backing down would abdicate all control
over its economic lever, forcing the U.S. to rely on military threats
to improve its negotiating position over its ideological archenemy.38
With these concerns in mind, Reagan issued NSDD-41 on June 22,
1982. Rather than scaling back sanctions and risk losing credibility,
he invoked extraterritoriality to prevent not only U.S. companies
from selling Western technology to the Soviets, but also their
subsidiaries and licensees.39 Despite staunch European resistance,
Reagan clung to his ideological view of American exceptionalism
and ramped up economic pressure on the USSR.
This hardline ideological position began to soften when
George Shultz replaced Haig as secretary of state and tactfully
showed the president his tactical error. On one hand, like Haig,
Shultz realized that European opposition hindered the effectiveness
of U.S. sanctions. In an NSC meeting two months after his
appointment, he judiciously noted “almost any trade measure in
East-West trade is more effective if implemented by all the Western
countries.”40 Instead of inhibiting a common enemy, these sanctions
created a “new and formidable barrier” to other objectives of the
U.S.-European alliance.41 In the months to follow, Shultz reasoned
that ineffective sanctions damaged other aspects of Reagan’s “Peace
Through Strength” agenda, particularly plans to deploy
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe. To Shultz, the
Western Alliance must erase all fractures “before the critical year
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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1983, with its controversial missile deployments, arrived.”42 The
new secretary of state showed the president that sanctions failed to
assert U.S. strength adequately and that new tactics were needed in
order to improve America’s geopolitical position.
On November 13, 1982, President Reagan decided to lift oil
and gas sanctions against the Soviet Union, representing a critical
tactical shift in his foreign policy. In return for backing down on
sanctions, European allies agreed to a series of vague measures,
including non-binding studies of Western European energy
dependency, harmonization of credit policies, and an agreement not
to “contribute to the military or strategic advantage of the USSR.”43
Though Shultz claimed internally that the policies “represented a
victory for the Alliance, not for any individual country,” these
resolutions were largely a face-saving measure designed to mend the
alliance.44 The sanctions had only served to delay the pipeline’s
implementation by a few months and had scarcely influenced the
situation in Poland, which was ostensibly the official goal of the
sanctions.45 Rather, Reagan aspired to mitigate the perception of a
fractured Western alliance, claiming that “the understanding we’ve
reached demonstrates that the Western alliance is fundamentally
united…” and that the alliance would coordinate trade measures
moving forward.46 Thus, the Siberian pipeline episode demonstrated
the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic pressure and forced
Reagan to reconsider hardliner tactics.
‘Reagan Victory School’ advocates point to National
Security Directives 66 & 75 to argue that the administration
continued economic pressure even after Reagan repealed sanctions.
Marlo claims that NSDD-66 specifically limited controls on Soviet
energy, as the Reagan administration sought to derail the industry
which accounted for between 60 and 80 percent of the bloc’s hard
currency earnings.47 Schweizer goes further, arguing that the
administration crafted NSDD-75 “to exacerbate the Soviet
economic problems in the hope of plunging the system into a
crisis.”48 These claims are not validated by the text of the documents
or the administration’s actions. Although NSDD-75 did seek to
“ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the
Soviet military buildup,” one of three central goals of the document
was to “engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach
agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests…”49 Even
Published
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hardline advisor Richard Pipes noted that “Reagan specifically
emphasized the importance of compromise with Soviet Leadership”
while signing the order.50 Thus, while these documents contain
elements of hardline policy, they also reflected the Reagan
administration’s central goal to engage its ideological adversary in
negotiation to de-escalate superpower tensions.
In line with this aim, Reagan consistently decided not to
ramp up economic pressure on the Soviet oil and gas industry after
the Siberian pipeline fiasco. Instead, advice from Shultz and the
moderates slowly resulted in a more measured U.S. policy geared
toward negotiation. On March 16, 1983, Shultz laid out a vision for
future U.S.-Soviet relations focused on exploring bilateral interests
and the intent to “continue serious negotiations” of arms control
with the Soviets.51 Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact Reagan
had labeled the USSR as an “Evil Empire” eight days prior, Shultz
stressed the need to “emphasize that we need to continue the
dialogue” with the USSR, and “negotiate in good faith in the
START and INF talks.”52 These views reflected Shultz’s growing
belief that the U.S. had built up strength during Reagan’s first term
and it was now time to pursue peace. The president began to
welcome this idea as well. Writing in his diary on April 6, 1983,
Reagan criticized the hardliners for not being open to negotiations,
saying: “I do want to try and let [the Soviets] see there is a better
world if they’ll show by deed they want to get along with the free
world.”53 In this light, the president viewed that “a summit meeting
could be a good thing,” as Shultz testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in June.54 Yet Shultz noted that, for such a
meeting to be productive, the U.S. must find a willing negotiator on
the other side. At this point, Reagan hesitated to take the first step,
still unsure about his adversary’s intentions. However, with Shultz’s
plan for long-term negotiation firmly in mind, Reagan began to ease
his rhetoric against the USSR and mend a fraught relationship.
This goal soon manifested itself in U.S. policy. By mid1983, the U.S. and the USSR signed a long-term grain agreement
and moved forward on a wide-range of discussions designed to
create a new cultural-exchanges agreement, upgrade the U.S.-USSR
hotline, and prevent nuclear proliferation.55 The real test, however,
came when moderates convinced Reagan to refrain from additional
hardline action. After the USSR shot down Korean Airlines flight
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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007 on September 1, 1983, Reagan resisted pressure from hardliners
to increase sanctions, showing that he had learned from the shortsightedness of his Polish policy two years ago. Rather, he took
Shultz’s view that the U.S. should “keep in mind what our long-term
objective with the Soviet Union is.”56 Instead of ramping up
pressure, Reagan recognized that “our arms control talks were near
the threshold of an important new phase… I didn’t want to smother
the nuclear arms reduction process before it had a chance to get
started.”57 In this light, the Reagan administration resisted enacting
new sanctions and slowly repealed existing sanctions, as evidenced
by its lifting of the submersible drilling pump embargo in early
1984.58 Reagan had no desire to repeat the fiasco of the Siberian
pipeline crisis. Instead, the administration realized the success of
economic pressure required a cohesive Western response.59
As Reagan abandoned his harsh rhetoric and policies, he also
began to reshuffle his advisors toward a more pragmatic group.
Reagan personally despised dealing with bureaucratic squabbles,
but nevertheless took on a larger mediator role as internal disputes
metastasized over his first term. At the end of this period, Reagan
again sided with Shultz versus the hardliners, commenting that:
“Actually, George is carrying out my policy. I’m going to meet with
Cap and Bill and lay it out to them. Won’t be fun but has to be
done.”60 This moment was part of a larger trend of declining
hardliner influence since the end of the Pipeline crisis. Soon after
Reagan backed down on sanctions in late 1982, hardliners Thomas
Reed, Richard Pipes and Bill Clark departed the NSC in 1983, while
UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick left after Reagan’s first term.61
Casey and Weinberger stayed on, but their influence diminished.
Shultz noted Weinberger’s unwillingness to yield in negotiations
initially found success, yet “its effectiveness waned, and Cap’s
capacity to be part of final solutions declined.”62 The waning
influence of hardliners symbolized Reagan’s shift toward a more
pragmatic mindset as the administration increasingly engaged the
Soviets in disarmament negotiations.
A minority of ‘Victory School’ advocates also cite two
incidents with dubious validity as evidence for continued economic
warfare. Thomas Reed, an assistant for national security affairs to
Reagan, claimed that the U.S. sold faulty software to the Soviets,
resulting in a powerful explosion that delayed the pipeline’s
Published
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implementation. However, as has been already shown, the Siberian
Natural Gas Pipeline came online with no significant delays to its
timeline.63 Additionally, historians have noted inconsistencies
regarding both the timing and location of his claims and the fact that
there “is no independent evidence corroborating Reed’s account.”64
Peter Schweizer popularized the second narrative, claiming that CIA
director Bill Casey successfully lobbied Saudi Arabian King Fahd
to increase oil output dramatically. As a result, oil price declines
limited Soviet hard currency revenues and forced the new General
Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, to institute reform.65 This evidence
is limited as well. Though most of the State Department literature
from the era is still classified, historian David Painter notes that the
vast majority of former administration officials do not mention
Saudi Arabian lobbying as an administrative goal. Furthermore,
economic conditions at the time gave the Saudis “very good
reasons—apart from US lobbying—to take the steps they did.”66
Thus, contrary to the views of the ‘Victory School’, Reagan moved
consistently away from his hardline ideological views and toward
pragmatic engagement once the Siberian pipeline episode
highlighted the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic pressure.
Gorbachev: Origins of Reform
Though American economic pressure had a minimal effect
on the Soviet oil economy, the Soviets’ energy sector still faced
objective economic problems. Whether these factors played a role
in ending the Cold War, however, depended on the extent to which
oil factored into Gorbachev’s belief that the Soviet economy
demanded reform. Oil price declines did weigh heavily on the Soviet
leader’s mind, yet his closest advisors were already convinced the
sector needed reform as a result of widespread production issues
over the past decade. Moreover, these reformers felt these
production issues illustrated broader inefficiencies facing the entire
economy. Gorbachev and his key advisors believed the flagging
Soviet economy had failed to deliver the promise of socialism and
desperately needed internal reform.
The general secretary and reform-minded advisors had long
understood the need to reform after decades of direct exposure to
Soviet economic stagnation. Gorbachev’s reformist ideology
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
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developed when he was a young leader and especially flourished
especially when he became the First Secretary for the Stavropol
region in 1970. Gorbachev gradually realized that overcentralization of authority in the state “sapped the vital energies of
society” and created a system in which “all initiative is
punishable.”67 In an effort to improve these inefficiencies, the First
Secretary experimented with collectivized agriculture in radical
ways. Faced with unproductive crop yields, Gorbachev granted
more autonomy to individual workers and family groups, allowed
some regions to lay fallow, and encouraged technological
innovation.68 These dramatic changes proved successful, and
Gorbachev passed on this knowledge to his superiors as he climbed
the party ladder. In a speech he designed for General Secretary
Andropov, Gorbachev wrote that “[i]n our opinion it is necessary to
give more independence to enterprises and associations in deciding
various production and financial questions.”69 Thus, his early
lessons in agriculture proved enduring, as Gorbachev later
extrapolated these problems to the larger Soviet economy.
Unlike most of his fellow countrymen, Gorbachev’s position
as a high-ranking party official afforded him the opportunity to leave
the country and gain firsthand knowledge of other nations’ social
and economic systems. After a series of trips to Italy, France,
Belgium, and West Germany during the 1970s, Gorbachev reckoned
with the difference between the modern Western economies and
their portrayal in Soviet propaganda.70 After returning to the USSR,
Gorbachev said the most significant conclusion he drew from his
time abroad was that “people there lived in better conditions and
were better off than in our country. The question haunted me: why
was the standard of living in our country lower than in other
developed countries?”71 This did not mean Gorbachev had become
a bourgeois capitalist; rather, he came to grasp the deficiencies in
certain aspects of the Soviet system. This willingness to challenge
accepted norms would manifest itself in policy when he became
leader.
As he ascended in the party, Gorbachev accessed new
information that confirmed his belief that the nation’s economy
needed reform. As a close advisor to Andropov, he and another
colleague, Nikolai Ryzhkov, led a comprehensive analysis of Soviet
economic stagnation in the early 1980s. According to Politburo
Published
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member Vadim Medvedev, this analysis was critical to understand
the USSR’s later reforms. Medvedev noted that for “the economists
who worked with Gorbachev on the analysis of the situation and the
development of a new economic policy, it was sufficiently clear the
official statistics distorted many indicators of the growth and
structure of the economy,” a view that undoubtedly resonated with
a man who had seen this stagnation firsthand.72 Although he did not
gain direct access to the budget, Gorbachev’s status as an upperlevel party official afforded him a unique perspective on the nation’s
economic status. He knew that “our budget was full of holes…
money was being drawn from the savings of the citizens and by
raising the internal debt.” 73 As he gained more experience,
Gorbachev realized that the broader Soviet economy desperately
needed reform.
Gorbachev, however, was by no means the only major party
official who held these bold views. The fact that key decision
makers within the Politburo shared these principles allowed the
USSR to enact the fateful series of economic and political reforms
that led to the state’s downfall. Politburo member Alexander
Yakovlev was particularly important in developing Gorbachev’s
conception of reform. In a scathing indictment of the Soviet
economic system that he wrote during his tenure in the Politburo,
Yakovlev decried a system in which “[p]eople’s labor and genius,
natural wealth and the material resources of society were spent
recklessly—without any thought to purpose, volume, or
efficiency.”74 Reformist Politburo member Anatoly Chernyaev
shared these views. In a Politburo meeting in early 1985, Gorbachev
recounted a series of striking economic inefficiencies that
particularly resonated with Chernyaev’s view that drastic reforms
were necessary to save a country “on the verge of collapse. 75 With
productivity in the food industry “two and a half to three times lower
than in capitalist countries,” “[losses of] 30 percent of our
agricultural produce…,” and “300 cities” without proper plumbing
and sewage facilities, he believed the Soviet economy had failed to
live up to its socialist expectations.76 Like Gorbachev, these
members seriously questioned the longevity of a Soviet system that
showed signs of stagnation across most sectors, including energy.
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Economic Reform of General Secretary Gorbachev
Gorbachev and his advisors understood the importance of
the oil and gas industry to the success of the broader Soviet
economy. Almost immediately after he took power in March 1985,
the new general secretary passed two reform measures seeking to
bolster the ailing sector. The first resolution recognized the wasteful
energy production of the past decade, as it called for “enhancing the
technical sophistication of production equipment... introducing
energy saving technologies, speeding the processes of drilling wells
and putting them into production.”77 The second resolution provided
capital, as it called for a marked 60 percent increase in energy
investment for Western Siberia.78 Critically, both of these initiatives
focused less on the macro-landscape of world oil prices than on
addressing the engineering and technological issues facing domestic
energy production. Furthermore, Gorbachev enacted both of these
initiatives in mid-1985, well before the November 1985 price shock
placed major pressure on the Soviet economy.79 Overall, these two
resolutions serve as a key indicator that Gorbachev hoped to tackle
energy production problems from the earliest days of his
administration.
Gorbachev also visited Western Siberia in September 1985,
marking the first visit to the region by a general secretary in nearly
seven years.80 Although the early timing of the visit underscored the
industry’s preeminence, Gorbachev’s speech there and memoirs
afterwards contextualized the region’s problems within the broader
issues facing the Soviet economy. While travelling through a city
within Western Siberia, Tiumen’, Gorbachev took note of a series
of structural issues that plagued the region’s productivity. Workers
complained “there was no concern for efficient use of natural
resources” and bemoaned the fact that the Western Siberia’s oilrefining rate lagged 22 percentage points behind the world
average.81 The general secretary also observed that the economy
failed to deliver basic goods and services to the region. Workers
lamented: “[t]here is a shortage of everything… The Soviet Union
and Europe need gas, but it turns out no one needs us.”82 In an
address to these workers, Gorbachev promised to help solve the
region’s basic issues. The general secretary proclaimed “Tiumen’
oil and gas would be developed on a healthier, more rational basis,
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including better housing and amenities, infrastructure, and industrial
support.”83 Even in the heart of oil country, the general secretary
focused his attention less on the specific issues of the oil industry
than on the broader problems burdening the entire Soviet economy.
Additionally, Gorbachev conceived of his ill-fated antialcohol campaign at least partially because of the economy’s
inefficiencies. Gorbachev saw the Soviet system mired in a crisis of
character. One symptom of this crisis was a plague of alcoholism
that marred both the morality and productivity of the whole socialist
system. The general secretary believed the state must rectify this
social ill, writing: “[t]oday our main job is to lift the individual
spiritually, respecting his inner world and giving moral strength.”84
Despite the moral basis of these reforms, Gorbachev and his
advisors also had strong economic incentives to address the
problem. Soon after Gorbachev became general secretary, he
learned the staggering costs of alcoholism: “9.3 million drunks
picked off the streets in 1984, 12 million drunks arrested, and 13
thousand rapes attributable to alcohol, along with 29 thousand
robberies… Economic losses attributable to alcohol totaled 50-60
billion rubles.”85 While implementation of the plan turned out to be
a disaster, Gorbachev firmly believed that gains in productivity
would pay for itself. Writing in retrospect, the general secretary
remarked that “special economic calculations took into account the
losses to industry due to drunkenness. The plan was to reduce
alcohol sales gradually (I emphasize – gradually), as it was replaced
by other goods in circulation and sources of budget revenue,”
highlighting his belief that less alcohol consumption would spur
significant productivity gains.86 Thus, Gorbachev and his close
advisors regarded even an ostensibly moral issue such as the antialcohol campaign as an inefficient use of the nation’s human capital.
Finally, Soviet leaders saw the high proportion of the budget
dedicated to military spending as a resource drain, especially during
a moment in which the economy desperately needed investments in
industrials and consumer goods. Despite his high status as a ranking
Politburo member, Gorbachev was unaware of the extent of military
spending until he took over the helm in March 1985. Upon assuming
command, he later wrote he was shocked to find that “military
expenditure was not 16 per cent of the state budget, as we had been
told, but rather 40 per cent; and its production was not 6 percent but
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20 per cent of the gross national product.”87 Although not initially
privy to the same level of data as the general secretary, Gorbachev’s
principal advisors viscerally understood the need to reform military
spending. Yakovlev scathingly commented in an essay written
during this time that “[i]t is probably impossible to calculate how
much was spent in fifty years on the militarization of the country.”88
While different advisors debated just how fatal the military burden
was, there was no doubt that both Gorbachev and his advisors
viewed the sector as a tremendous drain on Soviet resources that
necessitated reform.89
Gorbachev had long understood that the military drained
Soviet resources, but access to full information upon ascension to
general secretary shaped his fledgling foreign policy in truly radical
ways. By the 27th Party Congress in early 1986, the Soviet leader
had embraced the need for ‘new thinking.’ Though Gorbachev
undoubtedly held a strong moral aversion to the use of force, ‘new
thinking’ had a practical element as well. This party congress,
according to Chernyaev, cemented Gorbachev’s idea that there was
a “connection between every important domestic issue and foreign
policy.”90 In May 1986, Gorbachev exhorted his diplomats to
abandon the confrontational mindset that led to the arms race,
proclaiming: “‘Soviet foreign policy… must alleviate the burden’ of
military expenditures” and “do anything in its capabilities to loosen
the vise of defense expenditures.”91 By ratcheting down the arms
race, Gorbachev realized he could alleviate the pressure constricting
the Soviet economy since the Cold War began. Gorbachev thus
reimagined Soviet foreign policy, repurposing it with a new goal:
“do everything… to weaken the grip of expenses on defense.”92
With ‘new thinking’, Gorbachev slowly began to dismantle decades
of Soviet foreign policy insecurity, open up to engagement with his
superpower rival, and ultimately, thaw the Cold War.
Conclusion
Speaking at the Kremlin in a dinner for the American-Soviet
Trade and Economic Council at the end of 1985, Gorbachev
pointedly scolded American leaders for their history of ineffective
sanctions. “You all know the results: The Soviet Union has not
sustained much damage, but the commercial reputation of American
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business and thus its competitive power have been seriously
undermined on the Soviet market.”93 In 1955, 1965, or 1975, these
words may have sounded like typical Soviet propaganda. Yet in the
wake of the Siberian pipeline fiasco, these words likely rang true to
the audience of American business executives.
Though an influential group of hawkish American leaders
sought to pressure the Soviet oil industry, these efforts failed to
achieve their desired effect. The Reagan administration’s embargo
on technology critical to energy industry broke down when Western
European nations balked at joining sanctions. Instead of adding
pressure on the USSR, these sanctions exposed small fractures in the
democratic-capitalist alliance and temporarily weakened Western
negotiating power. Reagan realized that Shultz and the moderate
wing were correct. Unilateral sanctions ran counter to the American
president’s negotiating objectives and Reagan opted not to pursue
further economic pressure against the USSR for the rest of his
presidency.
By 1985, Gorbachev viscerally understood the need for
reform after personally witnessing years of stagnating growth and
declining productivity across the entire Soviet economy. The
general secretary and his close advisers firmly believed the current
socialist system impeded innovation and incentivized inefficiencies,
putting the Soviets at a disadvantage to Western market-based
systems. Stark problems in the energy industry did factor into this
calculus. Throughout the 1980s, stagnating productivity and
precipitous price declines weighed heavily on Soviet leaders’ minds.
Although low oil prices affected the implementation and
effectiveness of economic reforms, Gorbachev and his key advisors
planned to reform before prices deteriorated in late 1985. And while
stagnating energy productivity pressured the USSR’s hard currency
profitability, Soviet leaders understood widespread inefficiencies in
the context of the greater economy. Facing these fundamental
issues, Gorbachev undertook a radical program of economic and
political reform that unintentionally undermined the Soviet system.
By the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Soviet economy
was crumbling and the once-proud state was rapidly losing its power
over democratically elected officials in Eastern Europe. This result
ultimately allowed ‘Victory School’ historians to claim that
Reagan’s policies had forced a weakened Soviet Union into
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negotiations with a revitalized United States. Yet though the
outcomes matched Reagan’s goals, these outcomes did not result
from Reagan’s policies. Gorbachev’s willingness to engage the
United States came not from effective economic pressure from its
ideological counterpart, but rather from the fundamental
understanding that domestic reform was inextricably linked to
foreign policy reform. With a desperate desire to revitalize
socialism, Gorbachev slowly abandoned the ideological bounds of
his predecessors and engaged with an adversary open to change,
thus beginning the process that ended the Cold War.
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